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Abstract
Procurement auctions often involve quality considerations as a determinant of
the final outcome. When the procurer has private information about qualities,
various information policies may be used to affect the expected outcome. For
auctions with two cost heterogeneous suppliers, this work defines a notion of duality
between pairs of policies, and shows that dual policies are revenue equivalent.
1 Introduction
In recent years the range of auction formats that can be used in public procurement has
significantly increased, so that the available procedures include on-line reverse auctions
in which various information revelation policies are permitted (see e.g. General Service
Administration [4], page 12; European Directives 2004/18/EC, art. 54). Even more dra-
matic has been the impact of such new procedures on business-to-business procurement.
The information architecture underlying on-line auctions and specifically when and which
information should be revealed to bidders is considered by many a compelling research
question (see e.g. Teich et al. [10], Kostamis et al. [6], Rothkopf and Whinston [9]). The
model studied in this paper assumes a buyer who takes into account non-price attributes
when procuring a good or service from one of two possible suppliers (who differ in terms
of cost). It is assumed herein that the buyer knows how much the goods produced by a
given supplier fit her needs, and such fit is labeled simply as quality. Each supplier knows
what the buyer decides to reveal him, which is her information policy. This kind of setup
has been analyzed by Gal-Or et al. [3], who essentially focus on symmetric policies, i.e.
in which the suppliers receive the same amount of information, and a few more authors.1
However it is interesting to extend the analysis to asymmetric policies:2 indeed there is a
lively debate regarding the pros and cons of preferential treatment in public procurement
auctions (see e.g. McAfee and McMillan [7], Rothkopf et al. [8], Hubbard and Paarsch
[5]). Now suppose for example that the buyer discloses his own quality to one supplier
only. This means she is granting him an informational advantage. What would be the
consequences if instead of his own quality she revealed him the quality of his competitor?
1For example Colucci, Doni and Valori [2].
2In Colucci, Doni and Valori [1] we have studied the determination of the best information policy
(including asymmetric cases), from the viewpoint of the buyer’s expected revenue, in a related but
simplified model.
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This is an interesting question which we partially answer in this paper: in the case of
symmetrically distributed qualities nothing would change, both in terms of the buyer’s
expected payoff and the suppliers’. So what is shown here is that, given our assumptions,
for the suppliers the cardinality of their information sets is key, but the specific informa-
tional content thereof is not. In fact having a piece of information when the competitor
has none (or having both, i.e. knowing both qualities when the competitor only knows
one) boosts his odds of winning the auction, but whether it is his own or the opponent’s
quality that he actually knows is indifferent.
2 Model
Two suppliers j and k compete in an auction to provide a good or service which they
supply at costs cj, ck (costs are common knowledge). Each tenders a bid pi (for i = j, k)
with the aim of maximizing his expected profit. The buyer’s utility depends on the
qualities qj, qk which she privately knows. She can decide to reveal such qualities to the
bidders, in a way specified before the auction: this defines the information policy.
The suppliers’ prior information on qualities is that they are drawn independently
from a known symmetric distribution on the unit interval. The winner is the supplier
with the largest score qi − pi; the associated profit is pi − ci.
Each supplier acts so as to maximize expected net profit on the basis of his information
set, which can consist in one of the following items: the qualities of both suppliers, one’s
own quality, the competitor’s quality, or none of those. Formally, i’s information set can
be any of the elements of
I = {{qj, qk} , {qj} , {qk} ,∅}
and it is determined by the information policy. There are 16 possible revelation policies,
i.e. as many as the number of possible ordered pairs one can extract from the set I. Such
policies are organized into dual pairs as follows: the dual of a given policy is obtained
substituting qj for qk and vice-versa in the information set of each supplier.
The following table summarizes the dual pairs (where for each policy the first piece
of information is for player j and the second is for player k):
Dual pairs
1) ∅;∅ 1) ∅;∅
2) ∅; {qj} 3) ∅; {qk}
4) {qj} ;∅ 5) {qk} ;∅
6) ∅; {qj, qk} 6) ∅; {qk, qj}
7) {qj, qk} ;∅ 7) {qk, qj} ;∅
8) {qj} ; {qk} 9) {qk} ; {qj}
10) {qj} ; {qj} 11) {qk} ; {qk}
12) {qj} ; {qj, qk} 13) {qk} ; {qk, qj}
14) {qj, qk} ; {qj} 15) {qk, qj} ; {qk}
16) {qj, qk} ; {qj, qk} 16) {qk, qj} ; {qk, qj}
3 Results
We now prove that dual pairs of policies are revenue equivalent for both the buyer and
the two suppliers. Observe that four of the sixteen policies are the same as their dual,
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namely those numbered 1, 6, 7 and 16 in the table above. The results below trivially
apply to such policies, hence the proofs focus on the policies which differ from their dual.
Lemma 1 Let qj, qk, qˆj, qˆk be iid random variables with a symmetric density f[0,1], and a
cumulative distribution function F[0,1]. Then
pi (x, y) = pˆi (1− y, 1− x) for all x, y ∈ [0, 1] and i = j, k
where pj (qj, qk) and pk (qj, qk) are the bidding functions associated to a given policy and
pˆj (qˆj, qˆk) and pˆk (qˆj, qˆk) are the bidding functions associated to its dual.
Proof. We consider separately the case in which no one is completely informed and that
in which one of the sellers has full information.
1) No one is completely informed
Define
Gj (qj, qk, pj, pk) = Pr (qj − pj > qk − pk|Ij)
Gk (qj, qk, pj, pk) = Pr (qj − pj < qk − pk|Ik)
where I is the information set available to the bidder (i.e. I = ∅, {qj} , {qk}). Let
gi =
∂
∂pi
Gi (for i = j, k). Similarly, define Gˆi (qˆj, qˆk, pˆj, pˆk) as the winning probability in
the corresponding dual problem and gˆi =
∂
∂pi
Gˆi.
The sellers have to solve the problem maxpj (pj − cj)Gj (qj, qk, pj, pk)max
pk
(pk − ck)Gk (qj, qk, pj, pk)
which gives the set of F.O.C.{
Gj (qj, qk, pj, pk) + (pj − cj) gj (qj, qk, pj, pk) = 0
Gk (qj, qk, pj, pk) + (pk − ck) gk (qj, qk, pj, pk) = 0 (1)
Likewise, in the corresponding dual case the sellers solve the problem maxpˆj (pˆj − cj) Gˆj (qˆj, qˆk, pˆj, pˆk)max
pˆk
(pˆk − ck) Gˆk (qˆj, qˆk, pˆj, pˆk)
which gives {
Gˆj (qˆj, qˆk, pˆj, pˆk) + (pˆj − cj) gˆj (qˆj, qˆk, pˆj, pˆk) = 0
Gˆk (qˆj, qˆk, pˆj, pˆk) + (pˆk − ck) gˆk (qˆj, qˆk, pˆj, pˆk) = 0 (2)
Making G (and Gˆ) explicit for all the possible information sets we have
Gj| (Ij = {qj}) = F (qj + pk − pj) Gk| (Ik = {qj}) = 1− F (qj + pk − pj)
Gj| (Ij = {qk}) = 1− F (qk + pj − pk) Gk| (Ik = {qk}) = F (qk + pj − pk)
Gj| (Ij = ∅) = H (pk − pj) Gk| (Ik = ∅) = 1−H (pk − pj)
(3)
where H (pk − pj) =
∫ +∞
−∞ F (x + pk − pj) f (x) dx. Observing that, by the symmetry of
f ,
F (x) = 1− F (1− x)
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from (3) we obtain that, if qˆj = 1− qk and qˆk = 1− qj, then
Gˆi (qˆj, qˆk, x, y) = Gˆi (1− qk, 1− qj, x, y) = Gi (qj, qk, x, y) i = j, k (4)
Regarding gi (and gˆi) we have
gj| (Ij = {qj}) = gk| (Ik = {qj}) = −f (qj + pk − pj)
gj| (Ij = {qk}) = gk| (Ik = {qk}) = −f (qk + pj − pk)
gj| (Ij = ∅) = gk| (Ik = ∅) = −h (pk − pj)
(5)
where
h (pk − pj) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f (x + pk − pj) f (x) dx
and again, if qˆj = 1− qk and qˆk = 1− qj, we have
gˆi (qˆj, qˆk, x, y) = gˆi (1− qk, 1− qj, x, y) = gi (qj, qk, x, y) i = j, k (6)
As a consequence of (4) and (6) we have that, when qˆj = 1 − qk and qˆk = 1 − qj,
systems (1) and (2) are equivalent; hence their solution must satisfy
pi (qj, qk) = pˆi (1− qk, 1− qj) = pˆi (qˆj, qˆk)
as claimed.
2) One bidder is completely informed
Let j be the uninformed bidder. Suppose, without loss of generality, that Ij = {qj} and
Ik = {qj, qk}. Then, in the dual problem it must be Ij = {qk} and Ik = {qj, qk}. In this
case, j wins if and only if his score is larger than k’s valuation. So the problem for j is{
max
pj
(pj − cj) Pr (qj − pj > qk − ck|Ij)
and the bidding strategies are the solution of
F (qj + ck − pj) + (pj − cj) f (qk + pj − ck) = 0
pk =
{
qk − qj + pj if qj − pj < qk − ck
ck if qj − pj > qk − ck
(7)
Similarly, in the dual problem the bidding strategies are the solution of
1− F (qˆk + pˆj − ck) + (pˆj − cj) f (qˆj + ck − pˆj) = 0
pˆk =
{
qˆk − qˆj + pˆj if qˆj − pˆj < qˆk − ck
ck if qˆj − pˆj > qˆk − ck
(8)
As before, using the symmetry of f , we have that problems (7) and (8) are equivalent if
qˆj = 1− qk and qˆk = 1− qj. The claimed result follows immediately.
Lemma 2 Under the assumptions of Lemma 1, if qˆj = 1− qk and qˆk = 1− qj then
qj − pj (qj, qk) ≷ qk − pk (qj, qk)
m
qˆj − pˆj (qˆj, qˆk) ≷ qˆk − pˆk (qˆj, qˆk)
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Proof. Without loss of generality consider the case
qj − pj (qj, qk) > qk − pk (qj, qk) (9)
By Lemma 1 and using qˆj = 1− qk and qˆk = 1− qj we have
pˆi (qˆj, qˆk) = pˆi (1− qk, 1− qj) = pi (qj, qk) i = j, k (10)
hence, using (9) and (10) we obtain the desired result:
qˆj − pˆj (qˆj, qˆk) = 1− qk − pj (qj, qk) > 1− qj − pk (qj, qk) = qˆk − pˆk (qˆj, qˆk)
We now turn to the main result.
Proposition 3 Under the assumptions of Lemma 1, for any possible choice of the infor-
mation policy, the buyer’s and the sellers’ expected revenue are the same as those in the
corresponding dual policy.
Proof. Let J (resp. K) be the subset of [0, 1] × [0, 1] such that player j (resp. k) wins
the auction whenever (qj, qk) ∈ J (resp. K) in a given information scenario. Also, let
Jˆ (resp. Kˆ) be the subset of [0, 1] × [0, 1] such that player j (resp. k) wins the auction
whenever (qj, qk) ∈ Jˆ (resp. Kˆ) in the corresponding dual. By Lemma 2 we have
(qj, qk) ∈ J ⇐⇒ (1− qk, 1− qj) ∈ Jˆ (11)
(qj, qk) ∈ K ⇐⇒ (1− qk, 1− qj) ∈ Kˆ
The buyer’s expected revenue is
EUB =
∫
J
(qj − pj (qj, qk)) f (qj) f (qk) dqjdqk +
∫
K
(qk − pk (qj, qk)) f (qj) f (qk) dqjdqk
while in the dual it is
ÊUB =
∫
Jˆ
(qˆj − pˆj (qˆj, qˆk)) f (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk +
∫
Kˆ
(qˆk − pˆk (qˆj, qˆk)) f (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk
Consider now ÊUB. We can separate the part regarding qualities from that regarding
bids
ÊUB =
∫
Jˆ
qˆjf (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk +
∫
Kˆ
qˆkf (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk
−
∫
Jˆ
pˆj (qˆj , qˆk) f (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk −
∫
Kˆ
pˆk (qˆj , qˆk) f (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk
≡ S1 − S2 (12)
where S1 denotes the first two integrals and S2 the last two. Observing that
Jˆ =
(
Jˆ ∩ J
)
∪
(
Jˆ ∩K
)
, Kˆ =
(
Kˆ ∩ J
)
∪
(
Kˆ ∩K
)
we can write
S1 =
∫
(Jˆ∩J)
qˆjf (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk +
∫
(Jˆ∩K)
qˆjf (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk
+
∫
(Kˆ∩J)
qˆkf (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk +
∫
(Kˆ∩K)
qˆkf (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk (13)
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A simple variables change (qˆj = qj and qˆk = qk) in the two integrals over
(
Jˆ ∩ J
)
and(
Kˆ ∩K
)
gives ∫
(Jˆ∩J)
qˆjf (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk +
∫
(Kˆ∩K)
qˆkf (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk
=
∫
(J∩Jˆ)
qjf (qj) f (qk) dqjdqk +
∫
(K∩Kˆ)
qkf (qj) f (qk) dqjdqk (14)
Instead, for the two integrals over
(
Jˆ ∩K
)
and
(
Kˆ ∩ J
)
we can write∫
(Jˆ∩K)
qˆjf (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk +
∫
(Kˆ∩J)
qˆkf (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk
=
∫
(Jˆ∩K)
qˆjf (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk +
∫
(Jˆ∩K)
(1− qˆj) f (1− qˆk) f (1− qˆj) dqˆjdqˆk
where in the second integral we have set qˆj = 1− qˆk and qˆk = 1− qˆj. Finally, using the
symmetry of f and summing up∫
(Jˆ∩K)
qˆjf (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk +
∫
(Jˆ∩K)
(1− qˆj) f (1− qˆk) f (1− qˆj) dqˆjdqˆk
=
∫
(Jˆ∩K)
f (qˆk) f (qˆj) dqˆjdqˆk
Now, changing again variable (qˆj = qj and qˆk = qk) and proceeding backward using the
same set of arguments we have∫
(Jˆ∩K)
f (qˆk) f (qˆj) dqˆjdqˆk =
∫
(K∩Jˆ)
f (qk) f (qj) dqjdqk
=
∫
(K∩Jˆ)
qkf (qj) f (qk) dqjdqk +
∫
(K∩Jˆ)
(1− qk) f (1− qk) f (1− qj) dqjdqk
=
∫
(K∩Jˆ)
qkf (qj) f (qk) dqjdqk +
∫
(J∩Kˆ)
qjf (qj) f (qj) dqjdqk (15)
Finally, by substitution of (14) and (15) in (13) we end up with
S1 =
∫
(J∩Jˆ)
qjf (qj) f (qk) dqjdqk +
∫
(J∩Kˆ)
qjf (qj) f (qj) dqjdqk
+
∫
(K∩Jˆ)
qkf (qj) f (qk) dqjdqk +
∫
(K∩Kˆ)
qkf (qj) f (qk) dqjdqk
=
∫
J
qjf (qj) f (qk) dqjdqk +
∫
K
qkf (qj) f (qk) dqjdqk (16)
As regards S2 we have
S2 =
∫
Jˆ
pˆj (qˆj, qˆk) f (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk +
∫
Kˆ
pˆk (qˆj, qˆk) f (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk
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now, changing variables (qˆj = 1− qk and qˆk = 1− qj) and using (11)
S2 =
∫
J
pˆj (1− qk, 1− qj) f (1− qk) f (1− qj) dqjdqk (17)
+
∫
K
pˆk (1− qk, 1− qj) f (1− qk) f (1− qj) dqjdqk
=
∫
J
pj (qj, qk) f (qk) f (qj) dqjdqk +
∫
K
pk (qj, qk) f (qk) f (qj) dqjdqk (18)
where the last equality is a consequence of Lemma 1 and of the symmetry of f . Finally,
by substitution of (16) and (18) in (12) we obtain the desired result
ÊUB = EUB
Turning now to the sellers’ expected revenue, we have
EUj =
∫
J
(pj (qj, qk)− cj) f (qj) f (qk) dqjdqk and ÊU j =
∫
Jˆ
(pˆj (qˆj, qˆk)− cj) f (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk
Using again the change of variables (qˆj = 1− qk and qˆk = 1− qj) and the same arguments
used to get to (18) we have
ÊU j =
∫
Jˆ
(pˆj (qˆj, qˆk)− cj) f (qˆj) f (qˆk) dqˆjdqˆk
=
∫
J
(pˆj (1− qk, 1− qj)− cj) f (1− qk) f (1− qj) dqjdqk
=
∫
J
(pj (qj, qk)− cj) f (qk) f (qj) dqjdqk = EUj
4 Conclusions
This paper addresses information policies in a procurement auction setting where the
buyer is the sole judge of the suppliers’ quality in providing a good or service. The
suppliers are different both in terms of how much their product fits the procurer’s needs
and cost-wise. What the suppliers know ex-ante about their perceived quality is that it is
going to be the realization of a random variable. Given this context the buyer may decide
to reveal one or both qualities to one or both the suppliers. Such information is clearly
precious for the suppliers who have to bid in an auction to be awarded the procurement
contract. A notion of duality within pairs of information policies (i.e. choices of what
exactly to reveal the bidders) is defined in the paper and it is shown that, assuming
a symmetric probability distribution of the qualities, two policies that are the dual of
one another are equivalent in terms of the expected payoff for both the buyer and the
suppliers. From the policy maker’s point of view (or the modeler’s) an implication of this
result is that, in a context such as the present one, i.e. when assuming symmetrically
distributed qualities is reasonable, one only needs to consider (and choose from) half of
the whole set of available policies. Whether this result is robust to more general settings
remains an open question.
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